In my reflection on where we currently are in Northern Ireland
I want to draw on the work of
the political scientist Frank Wright who died tragically young in 1994. Frank seems to me to have had the only
original idea in 30 years of analysis of the Northern Ireland situation. He developed the idea of the ethnic frontier
zone and applied it not only to Northern Ireland
but also to parts of Central Europe and
further field.
An ethnic frontier zone is where two groups with different national
allegiances share the same territory.
Obviously Northern
Ireland is such an ethnic frontier zone.
There are three key aspects to highlight in relation to
ethnic frontier zones:
- The
relationship with the metropolitan power or powers; in Northern Ireland these are London
and Dublin.
- How
the law and justice system operates.
- How
democracy operates.
Frank Wright argued that an ethnic frontier zone enables us
to understand what a nation state is. He
says that a nation state is where internal disturbers of the state can be
effectively isolated, i.e. criminalised.
Reciprocal violence and vengeance attacks can be controlled by the legal
system. The legal system monopolises
punishment and no one has a legitimate reason for taking the law into their own
hands. In such a situation people more
or less routinely trust each other; there is freedom from fear. The legal system is ‘above’ its citizens, it
is a ‘transcendent’.
A key mark of a nation state is that the rules of democracy
allow power to shift from one group to another, because we are all part of the
one nation-state – a state which is ‘above’ its citizens and where the
‘non-nationals’ are outside the state.
In ethnic frontier zones, by contrast, “the law relates
differently to one community than to the other” and “democratic rules are mere
procedures in a battle whose results are never accepted” because the context is
always being argued about. Elections are
competitions between ethnic groups and within ethnic groups between those who
espouse ‘extreme’ or ‘moderate’ positions.
Crucially there is also little trust in ethnic frontier zones.
Frank Wright’s statement that in ethnic frontier zones “the
law relates differently to one community than to the other” is crucially
important. And the reason is that the
metropolitan power finds itself in a position of having to support one
community over against the other. Thus,
in Ireland, Britain has historically found itself supporting
the position of Ulster
unionists over against Irish nationalists.
Wright has gone into great detail as to how this increasingly happened
in 19th century Ulster,
particularly over Orange marches.
What I want to highlight is that when the law loses its
transcendence, its ‘aboveness’, beyond all its citizens; it becomes aligned
with one section of its citizens. Thus,
it is no accident that issues of policing, decommissioning and criminal justice
have been some of the most difficult in Northern Ireland.
Frank Wright says:
In national conflicts, law, order and justice are not just some of the
issues that happen to arise from other causes.
National conflicts, once they are fully developed, revolve round these
matters.
It should also be highlighted that the churches in Ireland also found themselves taking sides – the
Protestant Churches on the side of Unionism and the
Roman Catholic Church on the side of Nationalism. Churches also lost their transcendent
dimension – witnessing to tribal gods.
The Peace of
Deterrence
Wright has highlighted the importance of deterrence
relationships in ethnic frontier zones, i.e. a community has the power or seeks
to have the power to deter the weaker community from doing something about the
situation. What ‘peace’ there is is
really a truce based on the power of deterrence, and thus force. A change in the balance of power, or
whatever, can end the truce and set off a new cycle of conflict (e.g. 1969 in Northern Ireland). So the conflict can easily regenerate itself.
Once conflict starts again reciprocal violence becomes very
difficult to suppress. Violence can
spread from one incident in a chain reaction.
For this process to work it is not necessary for people to agree with
the violence done by their own community.
They only have to understand what is happening and be frightened by
it. Then, however much they dislike the
violence done by their own people to others, the other side’s violence is seen
to be more dangerous. The process can
develop until communities end up accepting the protection of violent people in
their own group, even if they know that they played a big part in starting the
situation. Thus we see how difficult it
is to remove paramilitary and confrontationalist groups from conflict
situations; people fear them but they also need them for protection.
Wright reaches the bleak conclusion that
National conflicts [i.e. conflicts
in ethnic frontier zones] do not, by and large,
end up with reconciliation of antagonists.
More commonly they are
concluded by victories or mutual separation.
He might also have added: ethnic cleansing. And we can instance all sorts of places in
Europe where this has happened, most recently in the former Yugoslavia. It suggests why progress in Northern Ireland is very difficult,
and why reconciliation remains elusive.
Escaping the Vortex
of Violence to a Peace of Agreed Political Arrangements and Stable Law and
Order
Is there any possibility of escape then?
Wright argued that the British and Irish governments must
work together to provide a transcendence under which the two communities can
come together. He saw the Anglo-Irish
Agreement of 1985 as moving in this direction and it can be argued that the
Good Friday Agreement of 1998 brings this sort of approach to fruition.
What has happened in the Agreement is that the nationalist
community and the unionist community have become equal in Northern Ireland and that both
communities are upheld by British and Irish guarantees, and by the two
governments working together (a sort of joint authority). The big new fact in Northern Irish politics
is that since the early 1980s the two governments work together closely. What normally happens in ethnic frontier
conflicts is that the metropolitan powers get drawn into supporting ‘their’
community (e.g. Cyprus where
Greece supports Greek
Cypriots and Turkey
supports Turkish Cypriots).
The new arrangements of the Good Friday Agreement were much
more painful for unionists (at least at the beginning). These arrangements assumed communal equality
and they provided confirmation that a British government would no longer
support them over and against the nationalist community, although without
abandoning them. Northern nationalists
lost the ‘support’ of Articles II and III of the Irish Constitution but gained
a closer involvement of the Irish government in Northern Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement was an ambitious
attempt to re-balance relationships between the two main communities where the
two governments provide a context for unionists and nationalists to work
together. It is not surprising, in
retrospect, that it ran into difficulties.
There were big implications for policing brought about by
the Good Friday Agreement. Remember I
said that law and order is one of the key issues in ethnic frontier zones. Implicit in the Patton Commission
recommendations was that the police no longer supported one community, i.e. the
majority, over and against the other, i.e. the minority, nor would members of
one community police another. Policing
becomes neutral as between the two main communities. And the minority are required to take
responsibility for policing – and this brought a lot of pain, for it is an
historic shift. It is not, therefore,
surprising that Sinn Fein found it very difficult to reach the stage of joining
the Policing Board (which occurred after the Executive was formed). And the fact is policing has been transformed
with the implementation of the Patton recommendations.
From Antagonism to
Trust? A Weary and Wary Peace
A society which has been governed by a history of
antagonism, and which has had a law and order system that has supported one
community, is not easily going to move into a situation of trust. Fear of the ‘other’ is always lurking
around. And so it has proven. And unionist failure to work the Good Friday
Agreement institutions has symbolised distrust for nationalists and
republicans. Republican failure to
decommission and consign the IRA to history symbolised distrust for
unionists. In a situation of distrust
people still feel they need protection.
Unionists increasingly vote for the DUP to protect their interests and
to stand up to Sinn Fein. Nationalists
increasingly vote Sinn Fein to protect their interests and to stand up to the
DUP. Another way to see it is in the
terms of the depressing bigots and bastards scenario: given a choice between
your bigots and our bastards we vote for our bastards (nationalists). And given a choice between our bigots and
your bastards we vote for our bigots (unionists). The positive in the situation is that
protection no longer requires the overt threat (or actuality) of physical
violence. At the same time the
diminishing threat (and use) of physical violence has allowed large sections of
the middle classes to opt out of politics and any civic responsibility. The conflict has mutated into less violent
forms: cultural wars and fights about victims and the past – but the conflict
has not disappeared. And the nationalist
and unionist middle classes can ignore each other: 'benign’ apartheid, the
peace of the suburbs. Apathy, weariness,
wariness and avoidance rule OK.
Given this history of distrust how did Sinn Fein and the DUP
find themselves sharing power on May 8, 2007.
The Republican leadership had discovered in the 1980s that they couldn’t
win through violence and started to make a long transition into politics. The DUP, or perhaps better Ian Paisley,
belatedly came to the conclusion that nationalists could no longer be dominated
and power had to be shared. Paisley’s ‘story’ was: “I have been forced into this and
this is a working arrangement”. This is
not reconciliation – at least not this stage.
Of course, it may become more than a working arrangement as time goes
on.
One of the problems is that people vote Sinn Fein or DUP
because they distrust the other community.
Sinn Fein and the DUP are dependent for their votes on distrust, but
they have to work together – be partners – if they want to share power – and
working together involves some level of trust.
This is a difficult balancing act, and the choreography around the
non-handshake of the First and Deputy First Minister needs to be understood in
this context. And, of course, given our
history, we have a sense of fragility and precariousness, that it could all
collapse. Violence as a mode to
political change is not yet unthinkable and, while daily life is no longer
defined by the daily fear of open violence about to happen at any moment, forty
years of violence casts a long shadow.
There is still not yet a feeling of solid ground.
The Peace of Truce or
the Peace of Transformation?
One of the key issues is whether this is the peace of truce
– and truces are perfectly compatible with continuing segregation and the
‘normal’ way of doing things – or is it a peace that leads to a transformation
of relationships in Northern
Ireland?
Truces are working arrangements that manage conflict, but they have to
lead in some positive direction, otherwise they are always at risk of
breakdown. So, May 8th was an
historic moment but it was only a sort of peace, certainly not a full
peace. And nothing much has happened
after May 8th. There has been
no legislation: everything agreed by the Direct Rule Administration is being
reviewed. We still do not know what
these people can actually do together, particularly on the contentious issues
that will have to be dealt with at some point e.g. on housing in North Belfast.
Perhaps the only way it will work is through deals, trade-offs and
sharing things out on a sectarian basis.
This will not be a pretty picture.
But perhaps over time things will evolve.
The Peace of
Prosperity
The Northern Ireland Executive published its draft Programme
for Government in the autumn. What is
interesting is the lack of mention of the words ‘Shared Future’ or ‘Community
Relations’. Seemingly the common project
is the creation of prosperity. But let
us not talk about the past and let us not talk about the change in
relationships necessary to make Northern Irish society really work. Nor let us talk about the duplication of
services and the cost of division as long as regional rates are frozen and
water charges restricted.
Of course, the creation of prosperity is not to be despised
and we need a much more entrepreneurial society and a smaller public
sector. But can we have a prosperous
society without the transformation of relationships and a positive dealing with
diversity? Are we not to talk about the
cost of division which constantly drags this society down. Research commissioned by the Office of the
First Minister and the Deputy First Minister on the costs of division had to be
dragged out into the public domain – and was promptly rubbished by some parties
and ignored by others. The research
estimated that the cost of division could be as high as £1.5 billion per year.
Separation and
Segregation: The Peace of Apartheid
At the local level there is certainly evidence of peace of
truce, where conflict is managed but there is little evidence (yet) of the
peace of transformation. There continues
to be lots of low level sectarian incidents (particularly at interfaces). Contested parades can set off tensions and
fears. There is little evidence of
significant cultural and attitudinal change.
Of course, it is early days yet.
There are now 46 officially recognised ‘peace walls’ (plus 11 ‘gates’). Since the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994,
more new barriers have been built in Belfast
and 11 strengthened or extended. Just
after the return of power in Stormont it was revealed that a further 25 foot
fence was to be built in North Belfast – of
all places, along the playground of an integrated primary school. There are also the hidden, less visible,
interfaces in rural areas. Residential
segregation shows no signs of diminishing.
92.5% of public housing is segregated with Belfast almost completely segregate.
The Claims of Truth and
Peace
Last June the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced the formation of an
independent consultative group co-chaired by Lord Eames and Denis Bradley to
seek consensus across the community in Northern Ireland on the best way
forward to deal with the legacy of the past.
How does this community face the claims of truth about the past? Do we want the liberating and cleansing, and
possibly disruptive, voice of truth? On
May 8 a new Executive was established and, hopefully, a new era of peace has
come into existence. Peace is a powerful
claimant after over 30 years of conflict.
But can we have both truth and peace?
The Claim of Truth
It has been shown in many situations that it is important
for a public account to be rendered of what happened and who was
responsible. Wrongdoing and injustice
are publicly acknowledged. Building a
trustworthy peace, it has been argued, requires honest discourse about the
past. Thus Truth Commissions have been
established in such countries as South Africa,
El Salvador and Guatemala. Of central importance is that these are
official attempts at truth telling. They
arise from, or are part of, a peace process and often incorporate political
compromises involving amnesties.
Thus, in South
Africa, amnesty was given to perpetrators in
return for public disclosure. The
perpetrators were held to account but they were not punished if they disclosed
what they had done. Signs of contrition
or apologies were not required, even though they did take place on some occasions. The victims were able to publicly tell their
story, and for the families of victims there was the possibility of finding out
what happened to their loved one. The
victims and their families were given respect.
The aim was the restoration of personal and civil dignity. A process such as this may be sufficient for
many people to put the past behind them.
What was given up, however, was the possibility of punitive justice against
the perpetrators. And this is an
explosive issue whenever it has emerged in Northern Ireland.
An official Truth Commission may help to change public
discourse and memory. The ‘facts’ of
some events and the responsibility for them may be established. Particular lies may be nailed. The magnitude of the hurt and the pain may be
exposed. All of this is important but
the limitations of such Commissions need to be understood. There is no necessary link between ‘truth’
and ‘reconciliation’. The ‘truth’ may
bring anger and further polarisation.
There is a real issue of how much truth we can bear (as opposed to
tribal vindication). The ‘truth’
proclaimed by a Commission may not be accepted.
This is because there are competing ‘truths’ in a situation of conflict;
what has happened is embedded in rival narratives of why it happened and who
was responsible. Truth Commissions
cannot bring the arguments of the past to a conclusion. New realities, critical and moral reflection,
spiritual transformation, changed relationships and time may, however, open up
the possibility of walking the past together and possibly of some ‘shared’
truth being established. But is that a
possibility now?
In Northern
Ireland the families of those who have
disappeared without trace seek to find out what happened to them. There are the disputed deaths by the security
forces in controversial circumstances.
There are the unresolved murders which the Historical Enquiries Team are
working on. People want to know exactly
what happened, and who did what. The
families of the Bloody Sunday victims in Derry
want the innocence of their loved ones established. And so on.
The Claim of Peace
Many people want answers.
Will a Truth Commission mechanism in Northern Ireland provide some of
them? Truth Commissions are grounded in
a peace process and appear to work best when there is a powerful political
consensus that ‘truth’ must be established.
The Northern Ireland
context of a fragile peace, where there have been no decisive endings, may be
unpropitious. Do Sinn Fein and the DUP
really want to face the truth? Do the
British and Irish governments for that matter?
Can peace survive the truth?
Nevertheless the issues are not whether we need a Truth Commission, but
how we are to deal with the past and when do we do it. Some reckoning has to take place. There has to be some encounter with the truth
– which is not a form of tribal vindication.
Therefore, love truth and
peace, even though there may be a tension between the two. How the Eames-Bradley Commission negotiate
the tension is going to be interesting – indeed that is true for us all. The instinct of most politicians – and of
many others – will be avoidance and moving on, because it is too difficult an
issue to deal with.
An Historic Moment –
the Peace to Achieve Peace
May 8th was an historic moment. But it has to be seen as only another step in
a long journey. It is not the end of the
journey – reconciliation and a shared future have not arrived. And how devolution will work remains to be
seen. The central challenge in Northern Ireland
is to change the historic pattern of community relations – of distrust, fear,
exclusion and violence – and to create a shared future of inclusiveness,
tolerance, equity, diversity and inter-dependence. The antagonistic and fearful relationships of
an ethnic frontier are not easily cast aside.
We have a moment of opportunity – we hopefully have the peace to achieve
peace (to misquote Michael Collins).
Finding a Voice for a
Fuller Peace
In this strange new world that is opening up we need
independent voices – voices that are not controlled by a DUP/Sinn Fein
dominated political reality, and who witness to a fuller and transformative
peace where new forms of relationships emerge.
One candidate for an independent voice might be that of the churches.
What might the churches be saying and doing?
- They
might affirm what has been achieved to date and recognise the continuing
challenges faced by the politicians but point to the silences and
evasions.
- They
could point to the need for a change in the historic pattern of relating
in Northern Ireland
– we need to transform the peace of truce into the peace of transformed
relationships. And this requires
parishes and congregations to help build positive relationships at local
level – this is the hard gospel.
- They
will hear people in their hurt, pain and listen and help them move on.
- They
will keep saying that dealing with the past is not going to go away – no
pact of silence is possible on this issue.
But authenticity on this issue may require the churches, jointly
and separately, to look at their role during the Troubles.
- They
will help church members to engage with the society that is emerging and
encourage them to make a contribution.
- They
need to affirm that Northern
Ireland needs to be a more
entrepreneurial society but significant numbers of people could be left
behind. There are significant
justice and equity issues and there are lots of excluded people. The churches need to remain committed to
the inner-city and the outer-housing estates.
- They
could acknowledge the more diverse society that is opening up and respond
to it – the stranger could be welcomed in.
This is basically a task of critical solidarity and the
‘trick’ is to get the right mix of criticism and solidarity. This is not about ‘baptising’ a new political
reality or of being in opposition to it, but being concerned for human
flourishing.
While some thoughtful speeches have been made by Cardinal
Sean Brady and Archbishop Alan Harper I have a predominant sense of churches
going to sleep, of weariness and tiredness, and of creeping
congregationalism. The Troubles have
taken their toll on the churches too.
Endings have to be acknowledged and grieved for. Seeking to rush into newness can be a
mistake. And, nevertheless, the call is
to newness. This newness will probably
come at the civil society and community level – and then be reflected at the
political level. Can churches be part of
it?
What we are seeing in Northern Ireland are huge but
incomplete transitions. There are no
blue prints for finding positive ways forward in ethnic frontier zones. The task is highly difficult and we need to
keep moving forward, always seeing the change perspective in decades.
David Stevens